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I. INTRODUCTION

If The Beatles' beginnings were humble, their legacy is awesome. In 2004,
Rolling Stone Magazine dubbed the quartet the greatest band of all time.'
Additionally, four of The Beatles' albums made that magazine's list of the top
ten greatest albums of all time. 2 The Beatles' music and style has influenced

* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2009; B.A.,
Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, 2006. Thanks to my faculty advisor, Professor Amy Landers,
for her guidance through the complex world of intellectual property law; my editors (especially Sarah and
Mary); my parents for being great sounding boards and financing this undertaking; and the ultimate Beatles'
resource, Ashley.
1. The Immortals: The First Fifoy, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 24, 2004, available at http://www.rollingstone.
com/news/story/5939214/the immortals-the first-fifty (listing The Beatles ahead of artists such as Bob Dylan,
Elvis Presley, and Ray Charles).
2. THE 500 GREATEST ALBUMS OF ALL TIME 1-29 (Joe Levy ed. 2005) (listing Sgt. Pepper's Lonely
Hearts Club Band, Revolver, Rubber Soul, and the White Album among the top ten).
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countless bands, including the Rolling Stones and Oasis. In 2007, The Beatles'
music was featured in the motion picture, Across the Universe.4 Today, the show
"Love," which combines the music of The Beatles with the performance art of
Cirque du Soleil, s is one of the most popular shows in Las Vegas.
Under current United Kingdom ("UK") law, the recordings of The Beatles,
and several other legendary bands, including the Rolling Stones, will begin to
lose their copyright protection over the next few decades.6 This has sparked a
debate over whether the UK's fifty year copyright terms for sound recordings and
performers' rights should be extended.7
On one side of the debate, UK performers (hereinafter "performers"),
including U2, Paul McCartney, and Eric Clapton, and the UK's recording
industry (hereinafter "recording industry") advance several arguments for
extending the copyright terms for sound recordings and performers' rights.8
These groups argue that the UK must harmonize its copyright terms with the
longer copyright terms of countries such as the United States, which protects
sound recordings and performers' rights for ninety-five years.9 Additionally,
performers and the recording industry argue that the current UK copyright law is
unfair because it provides music and lyric composers with copyright protection
for terms of "life plus 70 years" but only grants performers and producers of
sound recordings copyright protection for fifty year terms.'
These groups also argue that increasing copyright protection promotes the
creation of new works and increases the total number of works available by
encouraging restoration and distribution of existing works." Furthermore,

3. Who Made Who? The Top Ten Most Influential Rock Artists of All-Time, http://www.concert
livewire.comltoplOin.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2008).
4. Plot Summary for Across the Universe, IMDB, http://www.imdb.con/title/ttO445922/plotsummary
(last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (stating that Across the Universe uses over 30 of The Beatles' songs).
5. Love, http://www.cirquedusoleil.conmCirqueDuSoleilen/showstickets/loveintro/intro.htm (last visited Mar.
3, 2008).
6.

Not-so-Golden Oldies, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 2005; Musical Copyright Terms 'to Stay,' BBC NEWS,

Nov. 27, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/I/hi/entertainment/6186436.stm (last visited Nov. 8, 2008)
(stating that the sound recording of The Beatles' first popular single in the United Kingdom, "Love Me Do,"
will lose copyright protection in 2012).
7. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 13A(2) (stating the copyright term for sound
recordings); id. § 191(2) (stating the copyright term for performers' rights). Although there is no such thing as a
"performers' rights copyright," performers' rights are effectively copyrights in performers' performances.
Therefore, for the remainder of this article, performers' rights in a work will be referred to as a "performers'
rights copyright."
8. Not-so-Golden Oldies, supra note 6; Kenneth Mullen, Intellectual Property: Performers' Rights,
29(6) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 244, 247 (2007); Andreas Rahmatian, The Gowers Review on Copyright Term
Extension, 29(9) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 353, 353 (2007).
9.

ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

49 (2006), available at

http://62.164.176.164/d/pbr06_gowers-report-755.pdf, see Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (extending copyright terms in
the United States by 20 years).
10. GOWERS, supra note 9.
11. Id.
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performers and the recording industry argue that increasing copyright terms
would allow the UK to keep its "positive trade balance." 2 These groups also
argue that extending copyright terms is necessary to ensure that older performers,
many of whom lack pensions and rely on royalties from sound recordings to
survive, continue to receive an income."
Finally, several performers question the necessity of any limit to copyright
duration.' 4 These performers argue that copyright protection in the UK should be
perpetual. 15
On the other side of the debate, defenders of the public domain argue against
copyright extension. In addition to attacking the pro-extension arguments of
performers and the recording industry, this group claims that "[a] balanced
copyright system would be one in which the length of protection equals the
necessary incentive to produce a creative work.' 6 Consequently, defenders of the
public domain argue that because the current UK copyright terms are longer than
necessary to satisfy this, copyright extension is unnecessary.17
Andrew Gowers, a former editor of the Financial Times, drafted the Gowers
Review of Intellectual Property (hereinafter "Gowers Review") to weigh in on
this debate. This document examined and rebutted several of the major
rationales for extension of the copyright terms for sound recordings and
performers' rights.' 9 The Gowers Review concluded that the UK's copyright
terms for sound recording and performers' rights should not be extended.2 °
Because the Gowers Review was created at the request of the UK's Chancellor of

12.

Id.

13. Katie Allen, Musicians' Copyright Pleas Fall on Deaf Ears, GUARDIAN, Jul. 24, 2007, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/media/2007/jul/24/citynews.musicnews/print.
14. See Edward A. Cosgrove, Note & Comment, Minstrels in the Public Domain?: British Copyright
Legislation, and the Argument for an Extension of Performers' Rights Protection in the European Union, 27
Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 383, 401 (2006) ("If I can own the freehold, and thus the investment, in my home
property, why can't the value of the investment in my recordings be a longer-term or even indefinite heritable,
saleable right? I would have better protection as the bricks-and-mortar builder of my house than a 'builder' of
recorded music." (quoting Ian Anderson, Anderson Speaks Out on Recorded Copyright Law in the UK, Apr. 1,
2006, http://www.jtull.comnews/ukcopyrightlaw.cfm)); Anders Bylund, Rockers Aim to Extend UK, European
Copyright Terms, ARS TECHNICA, Apr. 12, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060412-6589.html
(quoting performer Joe Brown's response to the expiration of his performers' rights copyright: "It is thieving.
They give me a heating allowance but they are going to take my royalties away. It is a matter of right and
wrong. Why is this limit there in the first place?").
15.

See Bylund, supra note 14; see also Cosgrove, supra note 14.

16. GOWERS, supra note 9, at 39. Many supporters of the extension of copyright terms also accept this
principle. id.
17. Id. at 50.
18. Andrew Gowers - Biography, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/6267.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2008);
Gowers Review: Index, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent-reviews/gowers-reviewintellectual_
property/gowersreviewindex.cfm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) (on file with author). The Gowers Review also
weighed in on policy questions and made recommendations relating to other issues in intellectual property law.
See GOWERS, supra note 9, at 3-9.

19. Id. at 49, 56-57.
20. Id. at 6.
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the Exchequer,2'representatives of the UK presumably will rely on the Gowers
Review when the European Commission, the agency in charge of proposing
European Union ("EU") intellectual property law,22 next reviews its copyright
duration policy.
This comment examines whether the UK should advocate the extension of
EU, and consequently UK, copyright duration for sound recordings before the
European Commission. Part II provides background on current UK copyright
law, the Gowers Review, and the United States' extension of its
23 copyright terms
via the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA").
Part III weighs anti-copyright extension arguments forwarded by the Gowers
Review against pro-copyright extension rationales promoted by performers, the
recording industry, and the United States Congress in passing the CTEA. This
comment uses philosophical and economic writings and the United States
Supreme Court's review of the CTEA in Eldred v. Ashcroft24 to conclude that the
UK should not advocate the extension of the copyright term for sound recordings
even if it advocates the extension of the performers' rights copyright term.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Current United Kingdom Copyright Law

In the UK, several different copyrights "may exist simultaneously in a single
sound recording. 2 5 For example, a music "single" may provide the producer of
26
the "single," typically the record company, with a sound recording copyright.
However, that "single" also provides the musicians who play the song recorded
on the "single" with performers' rights copyrights, the composers of the song's
music with musical copyrights, and the writers of the song's lyrics with lyrical

21. Andrew Gowers - Biography, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/6267.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2008);
Gowers Review: Index, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ independent-reviews/gowersreviewintellectual_
property/gowersreviewindex.cfm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) (on file with author). The Gowers Review also
weighed in on policy questions and made recommendations relating to other issues in intellectual property law.
See GOWERS, supra note 9, at 3-9.
22. The European Commission at Work-Basic Facts, http://europa.eu/abc/panorama/howorganised/
index en.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2008); European Countries-United Kingdom, http://europa.eu/abc/
european.countries/eu-members/unitedkingdom/indexen.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2008) (listing the United
Kingdom as a member state of the European Union).
23. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (extending copyright terms).
24. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
25.

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE CENTRE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION LAW,

REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE RELATING TO AN EXTENSION OF THE TERM OF COPYRIGHT IN SOUND

RECORDINGS 5 (2006), available at http://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/policy-documents/gowers-cipilreport.pdf
[hereinafter REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE]. The purpose of this report was to provide the Gowers

Review with an independent assessment of economic evidentiary issues regarding UK copyright law. Id. at 3.
26. Id. at 5.
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copyrights.27 One individual or entity can own all of these copyrights or they can
be distributed among several individuals or entities.
Under current law, the copyright for sound recordings exists for a term of
"50 years from the end of the calendar year in which the recording is made" or
published 9 Performers receive copyright protection for their performances for a
term of "50 years from the end of the calendar year in which the performance
takes place" or, if the performance is recorded, when the recording of the
performance is released.3 ° A recording of a performance is released "when it is
first published, played or shown in public or communicated to the public."3 ' The
publication of a sound recording occurs when copies of the sound recording are
"issue[d] ... to the public. 32 Other works including lyrics, musical compositions,
and films receive copyright protection for the UK's general term consisting of the
life of the author plus seventy years."
The UK applies "the rule of the shorter term" to works created outside of the
UK or the European Economic Association.34 Under this rule, if the UK provides
a shorter term for a particular copyright than the country from which a work
originates, then the UK applies the UK's term for that particular copyright to that
work.35 On the other hand, the UK gives non-UK and non-European Economic
Association copyright holders whose countries of origin provide shorter
copyright terms than the UK only the protection that those shorter-copyrightterm-applying countries would provide.36
Because the UK is a signatory to several international treaties and a member
of the EU, the UK "can make no unilateral change to the length of copyright and
is bound by strong minimum standards., 37 For example, under EU Directive
93/98/EEC, EU members must grant sound recordings copyright protection for
fifty years from the "date of the first publication or the first such communication
to the public, whichever is the earlier. 38 Additionally, EU members must grant

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 13A(2)(a)-(b). 13A(2)(c) also grants copyright
protection to sound recordings "made available to the public" but not published for a term of "50 years from the
end of the calendar year in which" they are first "made available." Id. § 13A(2)(c).
30. Id. § 191(2).
31. Id. § 191(3).
32. Id. § 175(l)(a).
33. Id. § 12.
34. See id. §§ 12(6), 13A(4), 191(4) (describing the "the rule of the shorter term" as it relates to general
copyright terms, sound recording copyrights, and performers' rights); see also REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC
EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 6.
35.

REVIEW OFTHE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 6.

36. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, §§ 12(6), 13A(4) (describing the "the rule of the shorter term"
as it relates to the general copyright term and the sound recording copyright); id. § 191(4) (describing the "the

rule of the shorter term" as it relates to performers' rights).
37. GOWERS, supra note 9, at 39.
38. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 3, § 2, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9.

2008 / Strawberry Fields Forever?
performers copyright protection in their performances for a term of fifty years
from the "date of the performance" or, if a recording of the performance has been
made, from the date "of the first such publication or the first such communication
to the public" of that recording.39 Because this directive requires Community
harmonization, no EU member can unilaterally give longer or shorter sound
recording or performers' rights copyright terms.40
B. The Gowers Review
The Gowers Review examined and attacked several of the major rationales for
the prospective and retrospective extension of the copyright terms of sound
recordings and performers' rights.' Prospective copyright extension refers to
copyright extension that applies to nonexistent works that will be created in the
future.42 In contrast, retrospective copyright extension, as that term is used in the
Gowers Review, refers to copyright extension for works currently under copyright,
works that will be created in the future, and works that would currently be under
copyright if the extended copyright term applied.43
The prospective rationales that the Gowers Review considered and rejected
included: (1) the need to harmonize UK copyright terms with the copyright terms of
other countries, such as the United States; (2) the unfairness of current UK copyright
law which provides music composers with copyright protection for terms of "life
plus 70 years" but only grants performers and producers of sound recordings
copyright protection for fifty year terms; (3) the argument that increasing copyright
protection promotes the creation of new works; (4) the argument that extending
copyright terms would increase the total number of works available because it
encourages restoration and distribution of existing works; and (5) the argument that
increasing copyright terms would allow the UK to keep its "positive trade balance.""
The Gowers Review only expressly considered and discarded one rationale for
extending the copyright terms for sound recordings and performers' rights
retrospectively.45 According to this rationale, revenue from existing works is
necessary to motivate record companies to invest in new artists. 46 Thus, the earlier
that existing works lose their copyright protection, the fewer the new artists in which
the recording
industry will invest.47 Presumably, this will lead to the creation of less
• 48
new music.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. § 1.
Id. pmbl. §§ 1-2.
GOWERS, supra note 9, at 49, 56-57.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id.
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The Gowers Review is not law, but is merely "an independent review" of
'
Furthermore,
"the [United Kingdom] Intellectual Property Framework. 49
50
because the UK cannot unilaterally adjust its copyright terms, the Gowers
Review's recommendations relating to copyright duration are not binding on
anyone. The Gowers Review is merely a document that the government of the
UK may use in discussing copyright extension with the European Commission."
Ultimately, the European Commission will decide whether to extend copyright
duration for sound recordings and performers rights.52
C. The United States' Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
The CTEA extended United States copyright protection for existing and
future copyrighted sound recordings by twenty years. 3 Prior to the passage of the
CTEA, the United States gave sound recordings copyright protection for "75
years from the year of [their] first publication," or "100 years from the year of
[their] creation, whichever expire[d] first. 54 The CTEA extended this protection
prospectively for future unrecorded sound recordings to "95 years from the year
of [their] first publication," or "120 years from the year of [their] creation,
whichever expire[d] first."55 The CTEA also extended this protection
retrospectively for existing sound recordings to "95 years from the date [that the
sound recording's] copyright was originally secured. 5 6 The CTEA extended
copyright protection for most other works from "a term consisting of the life of
the author and 50 years after the author's death"57 to "a term consisting of the life
of the author and 70 years after the author's death. 58
Congress considered six general rationales in passing the CTEA: (1) the need
to harmonize the United States' general term of copyright protection with those
of other countries;59 (2) the increase of copyright protection promotes the creation
of new works; 60 (3) the extension of copyright terms might lead to the restoration
and distribution of existing works; 6 (4) the length of existing copyright terms

49. Gowers Review: Index, supra note 18.
50. See supra Part H.A.
51. GOWERS, supra note 9.
52. Id. at 39.
53. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
54. 17. U.S.C. § 302 (1976), amended by Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
55. 17. U.S.C. § 302 (1998).
56. Id. § 304(b).
57. 17. U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976), amended by Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No.
105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
58. 17. U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998).
59. 144 CONG. REC. S12, 377-01 (1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
60. 144 CONG. REC. H9, 946-01 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bono).
61. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 (2003).
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failed to take into account changing circumstances of modern life; 6 (5) the63
unique art-form of motion pictures required the extension of copyright terms;
and (6) because artists deserve the longest terms of copyright
protection
6
permitted by the Constitution, copyright extension was required. 4
The United States Supreme Court reviewed all but the last of these rationales
in Eldred v. Ashcroft.65 In Eldred, the Court held, seven to two, that the CTEA's
extension of copyright terms for both prospective and existing works was
constitutional. 66 In so holding, the majority declared merely that Congress'
reasons for enacting the CTEA were rational.67 In their dissents, Justices Stevens
and Breyer argued that Congress' reasons did not rationally support an extension
of the copyright terms. 68
III. ANALYSIS
69

A.

The Ballad of Sound Recordings and Performers' Rights

This comment examines whether the UK should advocate the extension of
EU copyright duration for sound recordings,as opposed to both sound recordings
and performers' rights. However, because of the demand for extensions to both
terms by both the recording industry and performers, two groups that have
traditionally clashed, one might conclude that the extension of one type of
copyright depends on the extension of both.7" The Gowers Review itself suggests
this conclusion by its simultaneous discussion of the arguments for and against
the extension of each type of copyright.7'

62. 143 CONG. REC. S2, 654-01 (1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 144 CONG. REC. S12, 377-01
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
63. Qianwei Fu, Note, Eldredv. Ashcroft: Failurein Balancing Incentives and Access, 38 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1755, 1773 (2005) (citing Chris Sprigman, The Mouse that Ate the Public Domain: Disney, the Copyright
Term Extension Act, and Eldred v. Ashcroft, Mar. 5, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/
20020305_sprigman.html).
64. See 144 CoNG. REC. H9, 946-01 (statement of Rep. Bono). ("Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of
copyright protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the Constitution. I
invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you
know, there is also [Motion Picture Association of America President] Jack Valenti's proposal for term to last
forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress.").
65. Eldred, 537 U.S. 186.
66. Id. at 199.
67. Id. at 204, 208.
68. Id. at 239-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 266-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69. Subheading based on The Beatles' song "The Ballad of John and Yoko." THE BEATLES, The Ballad
of John and Yoko (Apple Records 1969) (single release).
70. See Rahmatian, supra note 8, at 356 (suggesting that some performers may only advocate an
extension to both types of copyrights because of their failure to perceive the difference between sound recording
copyrights and performers' rights copyrights, the latter of which Rahmatian calls "music copyrights").
71. GOWERS, supra note 9, at 48-57.
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However, the EU's acceptance or rejection of an extension for the copyright
term of sound recordings would not necessitate a corresponding acceptance or
rejection of an extension for the copyright term of performers' rights.72 Although
under current UK and EU law both of these copyrights last for terms of fifty
years, both governmental bodies treat copyrights in sound recordings and
performers' rights as separate and distinct copyrights. For example, both UK and
EU law provide that copyrights for sound recordings vest in producers, while
performers' rights copyrights vest in performers. 73 Additionally, the respective
legislative documents setting out the duration of specific copyrights for the UK
and the EU set out the duration for sound recording copyrights and performers'
rights copyrights in different sections.74
Distinguishing between sound recording and performers' rights copyrights is
important because of the different groups that their respective extensions would
primarily benefit. Extending the performers' rights copyright term would
primarily benefit performers by giving them a longer period to restrict the
recording of their performances,75 the reproduction of the sound recordings of
their performances,76 the distribution of the sound recordings of their
performances, 7 and the rental or lending of copies of the sound recordings of
their performances 8
On the other hand, extending the sound recording copyright term would
primarily benefit record companies. Under UK law, the author of a sound
recording for copyright purposes is its "producer" 79 -that is, the "person by
whom the arrangements necessary for the making of the sound recording or film
are undertaken."80 Because this "person" is usually the record company, record
companies typically hold and, therefore, primarily benefit from the sound
recording copyrights of sound recordings."
Because, under current UK law, performers receive equitable remuneration
for the distribution of their recorded performances from the owners of the sound

72.

See REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 9-10 (arguing that if the UK wishes to

protect performers, it should advocate the extension of the copyright term for performers' rights, rather than for
sound recordings).
73. Id. at 5 (describing UK Law); see Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 3(1)-(2), 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9
(describing EU Law, stating that in the EU "[t]he rights of performers shall expire 50 years after the date of the
performance" and "[t]he rights of producers of phonograms shall expire 50 years after the fixation is made").
74. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 13A (describing UK copyright duration for sound
recordings); id. § 191 (describing UK copyright duration for performers' rights); Council Directive 93/98/EEC
at art. 3(l) (describing EU copyright duration for performers' rights); id. at 3(2) (describing EU copyright
duration for sound recordings).
75. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, § 182.
76. Id. § 182A.
77. Id. § 182B.
78. Id. § 182C.
79. Id. § 9.
80. Id. § 178.
81.

See REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, supra note 25.
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82

recording copyrights in those recorded performances, an extension of the
copyright terms for sound recordings and performers' rights would benefit
performers. However, there is no necessary connection between performers and
sound recording copyright holders such that performers must receive these
payments from sound recording copyright holders. Thus, if the EU decides to
extend the copyright term for performers' rights but not for sound recordings,
performers could continue to receive equitable remuneration once the sound
recording copyright terms for their recorded performances expired. For example,
performers could receive such equitable remuneration from public domain sellers
of the performers' recorded performances.83
84

B.

Copyright.: Beingfor the Benefit of Society or the Author?

According to the Gowers Review, "[a] balanced copyright system would be
one in which the length of protection equals the necessary incentive to produce a
creative work."85 This utilitarian view of copyright is at the center of the Gowers
Review's analysis of many of the arguments for copyright extension. 86
The utilitarian view of intellectual property posits that creators would not
distribute useful thought to society without "sufficient pecuniary incentives."87
These pecuniary incentives might be harmed if society freely exploited
intellectual property. 8' Therefore, through copyright, society allows creators to
treat intellectual property as their own property for limited periods of time in
order to ensure that those creators receive sufficient pecuniary incentives to

82.

Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, § 182D.

83.

Cf REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 43 (stating that public domain sellers of

out-of-copyright sound recordings must pay royalties to the holders of the sound recordings' music and lyrics
copyrights).
84. Subheading based on The Beatles' song "Being for the Benefit of Mr. Kite." THE BEATLES, Being
for the Benefit of Mr. Kite, on SGT. PEPPER'S LONLEY HEARTS CLUB BAND (Parlophone 1967).

85.

GOWERS, supra note 9, at 39.

86.

See id. at 50 (For example, utilitarianism played a key role in the Gowers Review's rebuttal to the

argument that extending copyright terms for sound recordings and performers' rights is necessary to remove the
UK's alleged favoritism of music composers over performers and producers of sound recordings. Ignoring the
alleged unfairness of the current system, the Gowers Review argued that no copyright terms should be extended
because "the length of protection for copyright works already far exceeds the incentives required to invest in
new works.").
87. Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent,
and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1389 (1989) ("Just as a farmer will not voluntarily
cultivate land if any other person can come along and harvest the land, an author without copyright will not
have sufficient pecuniary incentives to engage in the productive act of artistic creation." (quoting S.J.
Liebowitz, Copyright law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE
ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 181, 184 (1986))).
88. Id. at 1435-36 (setting out the argument that "[e]ven persons who might otherwise be willing to pay
for access to a new intellectual product might be unwilling to do so if they expect to be able to duplicate their
neighbor's copy. As a result, revenues may be low, the resulting incentives to produce intellectual products may
be low, and fewer intellectual products may be produced than the public desires.").
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distribute useful thought to society. Once its copyright expires, a formerly
copyrighted work enters the public domain and becomes the property of society. 9°
However, according to the utilitarian view of intellectual property, the
primary goal of copyright is to enhance social welfare, not to compensate the
author. 9' Therefore, because copyright establishes monopoly control over
intellectual property in creators-an economic evil for society-the duration of
copyright should last no longer than is necessary to provide Screators
with
92
sufficient pecuniary incentives to distribute useful thought to society. Because a
perpetual copyright term lasts longer than necessary to provide creators with
sufficient pecuniary incentives to distribute useful thought to society 93 and,
consequently, results in the "unnecessary inefficienc[ies]" of a longer term of
monopoly prices, 94 a perpetual copyright term is antithetic to a utilitarian-based
copyright system.
Although the utilitarian view plays a central role in influencing copyright
policy in the UK and the United States, it is not the only important theory behind
copyright. 9 For example, the "natural rights" or "inherent entitlement" view
(hereinafter "natural rights view") of copyright law traditionally influenced the
copyright policy of continental European countries.96
According to the natural rights view of copyright, a creator has a natural right
to own the intellectual property that he creates.97 This conclusion rests on the
Lockean view that "a person is entitled to ownership of the fruits of his or her
labor." 98 Because intellectual property is the fruit of an intellectual property
creator's labor, the intellectual property creator is entitled to own the intellectual
property. 99

89. See Cosgrove, supra note 14, at 388.
90. Id. (citing MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 4-5 (4th ed. 2005)).
91. Gordon, supra note 87, at 1437 (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158
(1948)).
92. Id. at 1344 (discussing Thomas Macaulay, Speech Before the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in
8 THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 195, 199 (Lady Trevelyan ed. 1866) (opposing a bill which would have
extended the duration of copyright protection)).
93. See GOWERS, supra note 9, at 50 (estimating that the optimal length of copyright is at most seven
years (citing Michele Boldrin & David Levine, GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (NBER Working
Paper Series No. 12769, 2006)), and the extra incentives to create as a result of term extension are likely to be
very small beyond a term of twenty-five years (citing Richard Posner & William Landes, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Harvard University Press) (2003))).
94. GOWERS, supra note 9, at 24.
95.

Cosgrove, supra note 14, at 388.

96.

Id. at 389 (citing MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 18 (4th ed. 2005)). But
see Council Directive 92/100/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61 (stating in its preamble an arguably utilitarian
justification for copyright extension: "Whereas the creative and artistic work of authors and performers
necessitates an adequate income as a basis for further creative and artistic work ....
").
97. Cosgrove, supra note 14, at 388 (citing MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 18
(4th ed. 2005)).
98.

Id.

99.

See id.
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Because the primary goal of copyright under the natural rights view is to
protect a creator's ownership rights, rather than to benefit society, natural rights
theorists are not concerned with the monopoly that copyright provides to
creators.' ° Therefore, while the utilitarian view of copyright cannot justify a
perpetual copyright for creators of intellectual property because of its disdain for
the monopoly created in the intellectual property creator, the natural rights view
can arguably justify such a copyright.' O'
Because the Gowers Review approached the question of whether to extend
copyright terms for sound recordings and performers' rights from a utilitarian
perspective,' 2 it did not consider arguments based on the natural rights view of
copyright.' 3 However, performers have raised the natural rights-based argument
that copyrights should be perpetual.' 4
Furthermore, the United States Congress seemed to apply a natural rights
theory in formulating one of its rationales for passing the CTEA. Some
Congresspersons advocated copyright extension because they felt that artists
deserved the longest terms of copyright protection possible. 5 Although
06
Representative Mary Bono Mack of California's 45th Congressional District'
acknowledged that a perpetual copyright would violate the United States'
Constitution,'07 she implored Congress to "strengthen our copyright laws in all of
the ways available to us."'0 8 Calling herself the "advocate" of American music
writers, Representative Bono went so far as to advocate a copyright term
consisting of "forever less one day. ' '09
However, because the UK primarily applies a utilitarian view of copyright,"
it should not advocate the extension of the EU sound recording copyright term
merely because copyright should be perpetual or because artists deserve as long a

100. Cf id. at 390 (arguing that "[a] protection regime grounded in a natural rights formulation can find
justification to protect authors indefinitely .... ).
101.

See id. (citing DAVID SINACORE-GUINN, COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF COPYRIGHTS AND
PROCEDURES, AND ORGANIZATIONS 113-114, 137-140

NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES,

(1993)).
102.
103.

GOWERS, supra note 9, at 39.
See GOWERS, supra note 9; but see id. (considering the arguably natural rights-based rationale that

current UK copyright law unfairly favors composers over performers).
104.

See Cosgrove, supra note 14, at 390, 401; infra note 14.

105.

See 144 CONG. REC. H9,946-01 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bono [Mack]).

106.

Congresswoman Mary Bono Mack, http://bono.house.gov/Biography/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2008)

(stating that Mary Bono Mack filled the Representative seat filled by Sonny Bono).
107. 144 CONG. REC. H9,946-01 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bono [Mack]); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 241 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he express grant of a perpetual copyright
would unquestionably violate the textual requirement [of the Copyright Clause, art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the United
States Constitution] that the authors' exclusive rights be only 'for limited Times."').
108.

144 CONG. REC. H9,946-01 (statement of Rep. Bono [Mack]).

109.

Id.

110. See Cosgrove, supra note 14, at 388 (describing the utilitarian view "as one of the bedrock
principles that animate intellectual property law in Great Britain (and America) to the present day").
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non-perpetual term as possible. As discussed above, a utilitarian view of
copyright cannot support a perpetual copyright term.
Additionally, the argument against a perpetual copyright term can be used
against the argument that copyright terms should be as long as possible without
actually being perpetual. A utilitarian view cannot sustain a copyright term of
"forever less one day" or less one year because such a term is unnecessary to
provide creators with sufficient pecuniary incentives to distribute useful thought
to society" and, consequently, results in the "unnecessary inefficienc[ies]" of a
longer term of monopoly prices."'
Even if the UK applies a natural rights approach in this case, it is not obvious
that it would have to advocate for the extension of the EU's sound recording
copyright term based on performers' arguments that copyright terms should be
perpetual or the United States Congress' rationale for passing the CTEA that
artists deserve the longest non-perpetual copyright terms possible. Under a
natural rights framework, both of these pro-extension arguments are based on the
view that a creator has natural rights in the intellectual property that he creates
because it is the fruit of the creator's labor."3 This view is quite persuasive in the
case of lyricists, musical composers, and performers. Because these individuals
are directly responsible for the creation of musical works, they seem to deserve
significant rights in those works.
However, this view seems less persuasive in the case of individuals or
entities who more indirectly contribute to the creation of musical works. To
illustrate, suppose that an individual provides sandwiches to a band while they
record an album. Additionally, suppose that this is a service for which society
gives the sandwich server a copyright. Few would argue that because the
sandwich server contributes his labor to the creation of the album by serving
sandwiches, that he has a natural right in the album to a copyright term equal to
those who were directly responsible for the creation of the album-the band.
Although the band would have likely created a nearly identical album in the
absence of the sandwich server, such an album would not have been created in
the absence of the band.
Because record companies merely supply the funding for musical works,
they are arguably more like sandwich servers than lyricists, musical composers,
or performers. Furthermore, because record companies, like sandwich servers,
indirectly contribute to the creation of musical works, record companies seem
less deserving of a term of copyright protection equal with those individuals
directly responsible for the creation of musical works-lyricists, musical
composers, and performers.

11.

See GOWERS, supra note 9.

112.

See GOWERS, supra note 9, at 24.

113.

Cosgrove, supra note 14, at 388 (citing MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW

18 (4th ed. 2005)).
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Therefore, assuming that lyricists, musical composers, and performers
deserve perpetual rights in their musical works under a natural rights theory, it is
not obvious that record companies deserve such rights. Consequently, extending
copyright terms for sound recordings, which would primarily benefit the
recording industry without being necessary to benefit performers,'"4 may not be
required even if the UK is impressed by the natural rights-based arguments that
copyright terms should be perpetual or as long as possible without being
perpetual.
Since the UK primarily applies a utilitarian view of copyright, the remainder
of this comment will not focus on natural rights-based arguments for copyright
extension. However, as suggested above, it is not obvious that extension of the
copyright term for sound recordings would be required were the UK to employ a
natural rights approach.
C. Happiness is a Harmonized Copyright System"5
Performers and the recording industry argue that extension of the UK's
copyrights terms for sound recordings and performers' rights is necessary to
harmonize the UK's copyright terms with the longer copyright terms of other
countries." 6 For example, these groups assert that UK sound recording and
performers' rights copyrights should have the same length of terms as their
United States' equivalents-ninety-five years." 7
This rationale should be rejected. As the Gowers Review pointed out, the
harmonization of the UK's copyright terms with the longer copyright terms of
other countries is unnecessary because copyright holders in the UK may
accumulate more copyright royalties than copyright holders of countries with
longer copyright terms." 8 For example, in the UK, copyright holders acquire
revenue for the majority of the "public performances of their work."" 9 In
contrast, copyright holders in the United States, a country with longer copyright
terms than the UK, receive nothing for the public performance of their works in
"around 70 per cent of eating and drinking establishments, and 45 per cent of
shops" and from all non-digital radio stations. 20 Thus, although copyright holders
of sound recordings may have longer terms to collect copyright revenues in the
United States, they may make less copyright royalties overall than similarly
situated copyright holders in the UK.'2 '
114. See supra Part 1I. A.
115. Subheading based on The Beatles' song "Happiness is a Warm Gun." THE BEATLES, HappinessIs
a Warm Gun, on THE WHITE ALBUM (Apple Records 1968).
116.

GOWERS, supra note 9.

117.

Not-so-Golden Oldies, supra note 6; Musical Copyright Terms 'to Stay,'supranote 6.

118.

GOWERS, supra note 9, at 49-50.

119.
120.
121.

Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. at 50.
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The Eldred majority suggested another harmonization rationale. According
to this rationale, the extension of United States' copyright terms might provide
"greater incentive for American and other authors to create and disseminate their
22
work in the United States."'
One can advance a similar rationale for extending the UK's copyright term
for sound recordings. According to this rationale, extending the UK's copyright
term for sound recordings will increase the motivation of record companies to
disseminate musical works in the UK.
This rationale rests on the assumption that artists and record companies will
be more motivated to create and disseminate musical works in countries with
longer copyright terms than in countries with shorter copyright terms. However,
as the Gowers Review pointed out, the phenomenon of artists creating and
disseminating music in countries with longer copyright terms may have more to
do with factors that have nothing to do with copyright duration.' 23 For example,
musicians may sign with American record companies instead of UK record
companies because of the greater size of the United States' music market, rather
then because of the United States' longer copyright terms.'2 4 Similarly, record
companies may disseminate more music in countries like the United States
because of those countries' larger markets.
Thus, the connection between an increase in the UK's sound recording
copyright term and the dissemination of more music within the UK is uncertain.
Because such an extension would "cost [United Kingdom] consumers between
£240 and £480 million in net present value terms,"' 25 the UK should not base an
extension of its sound recording copyright term on such a tenuous rationale.
D. You Like Composers Too Much

26

Current UK law provides music and lyric composers with copyright
protection for terms of "life plus 70 years,"' 2 7 but only grants performers and2
producers of sound recordings with copyright protection for fifty year terms. 1
Performers and the recording industry argue that this unfairly favors composers
over performers and producers of sound recordings.'29
Extending the copyright term for sound recordings is an unnecessary vehicle
for equalizing the treatment of performers and composers under UK law. As
discussed in Part III.A, extending the sound recording copyright term would
122.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206 (2003).

123.

GOWERS, supra note 9, at 50.

124. Id.
125. Id. at 57 (citing REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, supra note 25).
126. Subheading based on The Beatles' song "You Like Me Too Much." THE BEATLES, You Like Me
Too Much, on HELP! (Parlophone 1968).
127. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 12(2).
128. Id. § 13A(2) (dealing with sound recordings); id. § 191(2) (dealing with performers' rights).
129. GOWERS, supra note 9.
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primarily benefit the recording industry.'30 Performers will receive all the benefits
that they would receive if the EU extended both the sound recording and
performers' rights copyright terms if the EU extends only the performers' rights
copyright term and allows performers to draw equitable remuneration for the
distribution of their recorded performances from whoever exploits those
performances.'3
Furthermore, the disparate treatment of composers and producers of sound
recordings is probably justified because producers of sound recordings are
usually record companies.'32 In an article praising the Gowers Review, Professor
Andreas Rahmatian asserted that performers deserve shorter copyright terms than
composers because "the creative input of a composer, as compared to a
performer, is generally much higher, and that deserves a longer protection
period."'33 Because record companies provide less creative input to a musical
work than performers, record companies deserve shorter copyright protection
than performers. Thus, since performers deserve a shorter copyright term than
composers and record companies deserve a shorter copyright term than
performers, record companies deserve a shorter copyright term than composers.
Even if one assumes that record companies deserve an equal term of
protection with composers, the UK should not advocate an extension of the
copyright term for sound recordings because no copyright terms should be
extended. 3 4 As the utilitarian Gowers Review pointed out, "the length of
protection for copyright works already far exceeds the incentives required to
'3
invest in new works."'
E. Here Come the New Songs'36
Performers and the recording industry argue that increasing sound recording
and performers' rights copyright terms would promote the creation of new
works.' 37 According to these groups, extending the copyright term for sound
recordings would increase record companies' incentives to invest in new music
because "there would be longer to recoup any initial outlay.'' 3 8

130.

See supra Part M.A.

131.
132.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part I.A.

133. Rahmatian, supra note 8, at 354; see also GOWERS, supra note 9, at 39 (stating that "[tihe term of
[copyright] protection is intended to reflect the creative effort required.").
134.

GOWERS, supra note 9, at 50.

135.
136.

See id.
Subheading based on The Beatles' song "Here Comes the Sun." THE BEATLES, Here Cones the

Sun, on ABBEY ROAD (Apple Records 1969).

137.

GOWERS, supra note 9.

138.

Id.
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The Gowers Review rejected this rationale.'39 According to the Gowers
Review, extending the UK's copyright term for sound recordings by twenty or
forty-five years-to a seventy or ninety-five year term-would have only a
trivial effect on motivating record companies to invest in the creation of new
music.' 44 In support of this determination, the Gowers Review cited economic
evidence "that increasing copyright term beyond fifty years does not provide
additional incentives to invest, as4 monies earned so far in the future fail to impact
on current spending decisions." '
This argument is weak. Although it is not clear that every corporation makes42
the future,
decisions based on revenues to be earned more than fifty years in
record companies might do so."'3 For example, the recording industry is spending
significant money to advocate the extension of the EU's copyright term for
prospective sound recordings although record companies will not realize any
revenue from the extended terms of these prospective sound recordings for at
least fifty years.
However, even assuming that record companies make investment decisions
based on revenue to be earned more than fifty years in the future, the EU should
not extend its sound recording copyright term. Firstly, it is unclear what
percentage of the increased revenue, ranging from less than 1% to 6% total
present value of revenue,'" that record companies would invest in new artists.
There is no evidence that record companies would invest in more new music as a
consequence of receiving more revenue, especially if record companies feel that
their current level of investment in new music is sufficient. Instead, the record
companies might merely view the extra revenue as extra profits.
Furthermore, even if record companies invested this extra revenue into new
music, it is unlikely that such music would provide a significant increase in
overall societal welfare. According to the Centre for Intellectual Property and
Information Law at the University of Cambridge (hereinafter "CIPIL"), the new
works created as a result of an extension of the sound recording copyright term
be created with a
would be "marginal works"-that is, "those that would only
5
years."'
50
of
term
a
to
opposed
as
term of 95 (or 70) years
An increase in the number of these inferior works would not lead to a
significant corresponding increase in overall societal welfare." 46 Moreover, any

139. See id. at 52.
140. See id.
141. Id. (citing Brief of George A. Akerlof, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)).
142. Cf Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 254 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
corporation's incentives to invest in creation are diminished because the royalties from an extended term will
not arrive for many years and shareholders in a successor corporation may receive them).
143. See Cosgrove, supra note 14, at 413.
144. REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 34.
145. Id. at 46.
146. Id. (arguing that "with over 30,000 albums already being released [in the United Kingdom per year]

2008 / Strawberry Fields Forever?

increase in societal welfare would be diminished by the significant cost"between £240 and £480 million in net present value terms"-to UK consumers
from such an extension. 147
Performers and the recording industry also argue that extending the copyright
terms for sound recordings and performers' rights would increase the incentives
similar
of artists to create more music." 8 Representative Mary Bono suggested a 49
argument when the United States Congress considered passing the CTEA.
Assuming that increasing the incentives of artists to create more music would
increase societal welfare, it does not follow that the EU must extend its sound
recording copyright term. Under this rationale, the UK needs only to incentive
artists to create, not record companies. To incentivize artists to create, the UK
need only advocate for the extension of the copyright terms that benefit them.
Therefore, to increase the incentive of lyricists and musical composers to create
more music, the UK should advocate the extension of lyrical and musical
copyright terms. Furthermore, to increase the incentive of performers to create
more music, the UK should advocate an extension of the performers' rights
copyright term with a corresponding amendment to current law to allow
performers to draw equitable remuneration from whoever exploits their recorded
performances. 5 0
F. Fixing a Song'5'
Performers and the recording industry argue that increasing sound recording
and performers' rights copyright terms would increase the total number of works
available. 2 According to these groups, increasing copyright terms would provide
copyright holders with greater motivation to keep works "commercially
available."'5
The Congress of the United States considered a similar rationale in passing
the CTEA.'5 4 According to the Eldred Court, Congress extended United States'
copyright terms, at least in part, because doing so might lead to the restoration
and distribution of existing works.'55 Congress based this rationale on the idea

a 5% increase in the number of albums (already a very high-end estimate of any likely increase) is very unlikely
to yield a 5% increase in value.").
147. GOWERS, supra note 9, at 57 (citing REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, supra note 25).
148. Id. at 52.
149. See 144 CONG. REC. H9,946-01 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bono [Mack]) (arguing that extending
copyright terms would "maximize incentives for original creation" by authors).
150. See supra Part lI.A.
151. Subheading based on The Beatles' song "Fixing a Hole." THE BEATLES, Fixing a Hole, on SGT.
PEPPER'S LONLEY HEARTS CLUB BAND (Parlophone 1967).
152. GOWERS, supra note 9.
153. Id.
154. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 (2003).
155. Id. at207.
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that if a copyrighted work is commercially viable, then investors will try to
56
exploit it and, in doing so, will restore it and disseminate it to the public.1
For example, extending the copyright term for classic films would extend the
period during which copyright holders could collect monopoly revenues from
those films. Consequently, such an extension would motivate holders of the
films' copyrights to restore them and distribute them to the widest audience
possible in order to receive the largest revenues.157
The view that longer copyright terms will lead to the distribution of more
works is weakened by economic evidence that non-copyright owners disseminate
more sound recordings than copyright owners.'58 For example, the Gowers
Review found that in the United States only 14% of the sound recordings
published between 1890 and 1964 were reissued by the individuals who held
their copyrights. 5 9 On the other hand, 22% of the sound6 recordings published
during that period were reissued by non-copyright holders.'
Additionally, if the UK wishes to encourage the restoration of old sound
recordings, it should argue for a special copyright for restorers, rather than
advocating a blanket extension of the EU's sound recording copyright term.161
The former course will create incentives for individuals to restore old sound
recordings without rewarding copyright holders who do nothing to keep their
sound recordings commercially available.
Furthermore, by merely advocating the extension of the EU's sound
recording copyright term, the UK would make a value judgment between
commercially exploitable and non-commercially exploitable works. It is unlikely
that sound recording copyright holders would be motivated to restore sound
recordings in their extended terms unless those sound recordings remained
commercially exploitable because only commercially exploitable sound
recordings would yield the copyright holders significant revenue. Therefore, an
extension of the sound recording copyright term would lead to the restoration and
distribution of mostly sound recordings that remain commercially exploitable in
their extended terms. The UK would likely have to employ other methods to
restore and make commercially available non-commercially exploitable sound
recordings-for example, by providing "direct financial incentive[s]" to
copyright holders of non-commercially exploitable sound recordings to restore
those sound recordings. 62 If the UK does not advocate the utilization of such
methods but demands an extension of the sound recording copyright term, it will

156.

144 CONG. REC. H9,946-01 (1998) (statement of Rep. Coble).

157.

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 239 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
GOWERS, supra note 9, at 54 (citing TIM BROOKS,

158.

SURVEY OF REISSUES OF U.S. RECORDINGS

(2005)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 46 (citing Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante
Versus Ex Post Justificationsfor IntellectualProperty, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 140 (2004)).
162. Fu, supra note 63, at 1774 (2005) (discussing this argument in the context of old films).
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make an implicit value judgment that commercially exploitable works deserve
society's protection more than non-commercially exploitable works. However, it
is certainly debatable whether non-commercially exploitable works are less
deserving of society's protection than commercially exploitable works.
The Gowers Review pointed out a final compelling rationale for not
extending sound recording copyright terms in order to increase the total number
of works available. According to this rationale, an extension of the copyright
terms would require artists who wished to incorporate existing works into their
new creations (so-called "follow-on creators") to obtain the permission of those
works' copyright holders or their heirs for longer periods of time than under
current UK law. 63 For example, extending UK copyright terms for sound
recordings to the United States' term of ninety-five years would require followon creators to obtain this permission for an additional forty-five years.'" As
Justice Breyer pointed out in his Eldred dissent, this extra period during which
follow-on creators would have to obtain permission is significant because it
represents further time during which a copyright holder could "deny permission
either outright or through misinformed efforts to bargain."'' 65 Therefore, extending
copyright terms might harm the ability of follow-on creators to create new works
because it would increase the likelihood of their being barred from incorporating
existing copyrighted works into their new creations-a practice on which followon creators, by definition, rely.' 66 This would
lead to a decrease in the number of
6
works that would otherwise be available.' 1
G. You're Going to Lose That "Positive Trade Balance'

68

Performers and the recording industry argue that increasing copyright terms
would allow the UK to keep its "positive trade balance."'' 69 According to these
groups, the UK's music industry's ten to fifteen percent share of the global music
market would be harmed by the European Commission's failure to extend
copyright terms.'"
The United States Congress considered this rationale as it related to the
United States when it extended the United States' copyright terms through the
CTEA. 17 According to Utah Senator Orrin Hatch, the United States' failure to
extend its copyright terms would hurt the United States' international trading
163.

See GOWERS, supra note 9, at 54.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304(b) (1998).
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 250 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
GOWERS, supra note 9, at 54.
Id.
Subheading based on The Beatles' song "You're Going to Lose That Girl." THE BEATLES, You're

Going to Lose That Girl, on HELP! (Parlophone 1968).
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170.
171.

GOWERS, supra note 9.
Id.
144 CONG. REc. S12,377-01 (1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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advantage because American works would lose their copyright and fall into the
public domain twenty years earlier in countries applying the life of the author
standard and "the rule of the shorter term"
plus seventy years general copyright
72
countries.1
those
of
works
than the
For example, Senator Hatch argued that if the United States did not extend its
general copyright term to consist of, at a minimum, the life of the author plus
seventy years, EU countries, applying the rule of the shorter term,' 73 would only
give American works to which a general copyright applied protection for a term
of the life of the author plus fifty years. 7 4 On the other hand, works to which a
general copyright applied from countries that provided a general copyright for at
least a term of the life of the author plus seventy years, would receive protection
for a term of the life of the author plus seventy years in EU countries.' 75
The Gowers Review responded to this rationale by arguing that the extension
of sound recording and performers' rights copyright terms is unnecessary to
maintain the UK's "positive trade balance."'' 76 According to the Gowers Review,
most countries with larger markets and longer copyright terms, such as the
United States and Australia, do not apply "the rule of the shorter term."' 77 Thus,
the term granted to British phonograms" and
any extension would not "affect
8
countries.1
those
in
performers
This argument ignores countries that apply "the rule of the shorter term" and
have longer copyright terms than the UK: India, Honduras, and Guatemala.'79
Furthermore, this argument ignores the fact that in order for the UK's sound
recording copyright term to be extended, the EU would have to adopt such an
extension.' 80 This would provide record companies with longer copyrights not
only in the UK, but also in every other EU country.""
However, even considering these things, the negative effects of extending the
UK's sound recording copyright term outweigh the positive effects of such an
extension.'82 The UK imports forty-three percent of its music from abroad,
representing roughly $1.5 billion in foreign recordings in 2004.'83 Non-UK

172. Id.
173. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 7(2), 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9.
174. 144 CONG. REC. S12,377-01 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
175. Id.
176. GOWERS, supra note 9, at 55-56.
177. Id. at 55 (calling "the rule of the shorter term" a "comparison of terms").
178. Id. at 55-56 (citing REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, supra note 25).
179. REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 37, 39 (calling "the rule of the shorter
term" a "comparison of terms").
180. Cosgrove, supra note 14, at 418.
181. Cf id. (arguing that "benefits would flow to British performers under an extension to [performers'
rights] term because their recordings would be forestalled from entering the public domain both in the U.K. and
in the E.U.").
182. REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 39.
183. Id. at 37, 39.

2008 / Strawberry Fields Forever?
copyright owners receive most of this revenue.' " Consequently, an extension of
the copyright term would result in more revenue going abroad as foreign sound
recordings received longer copyright terms in the UK.'85
The extra revenue that the UK would lose abroad as a result of an extension
of the sound recording copyright term would not be negated by gains from such
an extension. 6 For example, the CIPIL estimated that an extension of the sound
recording copyright term would yield at most $17 million from all UK music
sales to the countries of India, Honduras, and Guatemala.'
Additionally, the
CIPIL estimated that the losses that the UK would sustain as a result of such an
extension would not be offset by gains accrued from the extended sound
recording copyright term provided to UK sound recordings in other EU countries,
where the UK imported a maximum of $1.1 billion in sound recordings in
2004.88
The Gowers Review did not consider a final argument for extending
copyright terms in order to maintain the UK's positive trade balance. According
to this argument, although the United States currently does not apply "the rule of
the shorter term,"' 89 it may apply such a rule if the EU does not extend its sound
recording copyright term. Under current law, the United States provides EU, and,
consequently, UK, sound recordings with copyright terms of ninety-five years.' 9°
However, because EU countries apply "the rule of the shorter term,"' 9' they only
give United States sound recordings copyright protection for terms of fifty
years.192 Therefore, the United States provides EU copyright holders with fortyfive more years of monopoly prices than the EU provides United States copyright
holders.
There is no indication that the United States is displeased with this current
system. However, one of the reasons that the United States changed its previous
copyright system via the CTEA was to protect its international trading advantage
that some Congresspersons felt was threatened by the loss of twenty years of
copyright protection in EU countries.' 9 3
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H. When I'm Sixty-Four 94
According to rock band "The Who" lead singer Roger Daltrey, "[t]housands
of musicians have no pensions and rely on royalties [from sound recordings] to
support themselves."'' 95 Because of this, performers and the recording industry
argue that extending copyright duration for sound recording and performers'
rights copyright terms is necessary
to ensure that the majority of older performers
96
income.
an
receive
to
continue
In passing the CTEA, the United States Congress considered the similar
rationale that existing copyright terms failed to take into account changing
circumstances of modem life. 197 According to this rationale, because people live
longer and raise children later in life than they did in 1976, when Congress last
amended copyright terms,' 98 pre-CTEA copyright terms did not adequately
protect or yield a fair return to authors, authors' heirs, or authors' dependents.' 99
Additionally, technology, such as the internet, has extended "the marketable lives
of creative works" beyond those of creative works existing in 1976.200
The EU should not extend its sound recording copyright term to allow older
performers, performers' heirs, or performers' dependents to receive royalties
from the performers' recorded performances for longer periods of time. As
discussed in Part III.A, extending the sound recording copyright term would
primarily benefit the recording industry without being necessary to benefit
performers.20 ' The EU can ensure that older performers, performers' heirs, and
performers' dependents receive royalties for longer periods of time if it merely
extends its performers' rights copyright term and allows performers, performers'
heirs, and performers' dependents to draw equitable remuneration for the
distribution
of the performers'
recorded performances from whoever exploits
-t
202
those performances.
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L

Baby You're a Rich Man (Now Why Should We Give You Longer Monopoly
°
Control?)2
3

As this comment pointed out in Part II.B, the Gowers Review only expressly
discussed one rationale for the retrospective extension of sound recording and
performers' rights copyright terms.2°' According to this rationale, revenue from
existing works is necessary to motivate record companies to invest in new
artists.0 5 Thus, the earlier that existing works lose their copyright protection, the
less new artists in which the recording industry
will invest. Presumably, this
2 °7
will lead to the creation of less new music.
In passing the CTEA, the United States Congress considered this rationale.
For example, United States Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters informed
Congress that the increased revenues created by extended copyright terms might
"finance the production and publication of new works. 2 8
The Gowers Review referred to "anecdotal evidence" of new record
companies signing new bands to rebut this rationale's conclusion that retaining
copyright terms at fifty years would damage record companies' incentives to
invest in new music. 20 9 The Gowers Review pointed out that the Kaiser Chiefs
and Franz Ferdinand, two artists popular in the UK, were signed to record
companies founded during the last 15 years. 210 Presumably this was meant to
show that the connection between receiving revenue from existing works and
investing in new artists is tenuous because these record companies did not hold
the copyrights of many existing sound recordings created before they were
founded but, nevertheless, signed new acts. 211
This argument, standing alone, cannot defeat the rationale that the Gowers
Review considered for the retrospective extension of the sound recording
copyright term. The fact that several record companies with few sound recording
copyrights signed a few well-known bands shows that revenue from existing
works is not necessary to motivate record companies to invest in new artists.
However, this does not defeat the argument that extending the copyright term for
sound recordings will have a positive effect on the signing of new artists. If the
majority of record companies are motivated to invest in new artists by increased
revenue from existing works, then increasing that revenue from an extension to
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the sound recording copyright term will lead to an increase in investment in new
artists. This will lead to the creation of more new music.
Nevertheless, the UK should reject this rationale for the retrospective
extension of the sound recording copyright term because, as the Gowers Review
suggested, such an extension would benefit sound recording copyright holders
much less than it would harm consumers. 112 According to the CIPIL, a twenty
year extension and a forty-five year extension of the copyright terms of existing
sound recordings would only lead to, at most, an increase in the present value of
revenue generated from all of those sound recordings of 1.8 percent (£156
million) and 1.9 percent (£163 million) respectively for copyright holders of
those sound recordings.2 " Furthermore, most of this increased revenue would go
to the copyright holders of the small number of sound recordings that remained
commercially viable after fifty years.

214

On the other hand, the cost to consumers of the retrospective extension of the
copyright term for sound recordings would be significant. 2' 5 According to the
Gowers Review, the prices of popular sound recordings should drop as those
sound recordings enter the public domain as a result of the competition fostered
by the ability of multiple companies to sell those sound recordings.2 6 Therefore,
by extending the sound recording copyright term, the UK would extend the
period of time during which popular sound recordings could be sold to
consumers at higher, monopoly prices.2 7 Furthermore, as Justice Breyer
suggested in his Eldred dissent, this extended copyright term would indirectly
increase the costs of goods and services having nothing to do with sound
recordings.2 " From these things, the Gowers Review estimated that the extension
of the UK's sound recording copyright term would "cost consumers between
£240 and £480 million in net present value terms." 2 9
IV. CONCLUSION

The most compelling arguments for extending copyright terms for sound
recordings deal with aiding performers. However, the UK can combat its
perceived favoritism of composers over performers and provide aid to older
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performers and their heirs and dependants without supporting an extension of the
EU's sound recording copyright term. 2' ° As was discussed in Part III.A, the UK
can provide its performers with all the benefits that they would receive as a result
of an extension of both the sound recording and performers' rights copyright
terms if the UK convinces the EU to extend the performers' rights copyright term
and to allow performers to draw equitable remuneration for the distribution of
their recorded performances from whomever exploits those performances. 22' This
would allow the UK to give its performers copyright terms equal to the terms
possessed by its composers. This would also allow performers, performers' heirs,
and performers' dependants to continue to receive royalties from their recorded
performances even after the sound recordings of those performances lose their
copyright protection.
The rest of the pro-sound recording copyright term extension rationales fail
under a utilitarian theory of copyright. For example, any benefits that might
result from harmonizing the UK's copyright terms with those of countries with
longer terms, 222 increasing the incentives of record companies to invest in the
creation of new music,123 and increasing the motivation of record companies to
distribute existing works,224 would be outweighed by the significant costs to
consumers of an extension of the EU's sound recording copyright term.225
Furthermore, such an extension would harm the UK's balance of trade.226
All of these things indicate that, with respect to the question of whether or
not to advocate the extension of the EU's sound recording copyright term, the
UK should follow the advice of its greatest band: "let it be."
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